The U.S. defense industrial base and all branches of the U.S. military depend heavily on materials produced by China to make and use critical weapon systems, creating national security risks, a government watchdog warned in a recent report.
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However, this database currently “provides limited information about the countries of origin,” a July 24 Government Accountability Office report found, and federal contractors are not currently contractually obligated to tell DOD where all of their manufacturing components originate from.
Of over 99 materials total identified by DOD in shortfall for fiscal 2023, none were made in the U.S., GAO noted.
The result is that many components used in key weapon systems and military equipment are being manufactured by China and other countries with adversarial aims to the United States.
“These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways,” GAO said.
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In another instance cited by the watchdog, manufacturing of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was brought to a standstill due to the discovery of Chinese components during production. Although the fighter is being produced with the aid of seven allied partner nations — including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and several European Union countries — magnets included in the warplanes originated from China.
“The F-35 prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, identified prohibited Chinese magnets in the F-35 supply chain and notified DOD in 2023 and 2024. DOD subsequently paused manufacturing for several months to identify alternative suppliers,” according to the report.
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“The U.S. has only one foundry that can produce large titanium casting required for some key weapons systems,” the report noted.
Although DOD has noted the risk of foreign dependency, GAO said, it has taken no action to implement any recommended improvements, which would include efforts toward more detailed and transparent tracking of the country of origin of critical military components.
“One untested approach that DOD officials stated could give DOD more visibility into foreign dependency risks is to contractually require suppliers to provide the information,” the report said. “While some DOD officials assert the information is readily available, others stated this approach may be too costly or that suppliers may not be willing to provide information.”